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INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: A BOOK REVIEW'

Randall C. Young*
Industry Self-Regulation and Voluntary Environmental
Compliance examines how programs that encourage industry to
voluntarily exceed the minimum strictures of existing regulations
might be developed.
In setting out the premise of the book, the publisher's blurb

states:
that to be successful, environmental policy must move to the next
level, one in which we take advantage of voluntary self-regulation
initiatives and focus on environmental improvement. Industry
Self-Regulation and Voluntary EnvironmentalComplianceshows

you how to create a voluntary self-regulation program that will
result in your organization becoming a star company.2

The last sentence is a bit off the mark. Instead of a
management primer on implementing systems for maintaining
environmental compliance, Dr. Iannuzzi provides information and
analysis about four separate programs. From this analysis he offers
general guidelines for developing environmental self-regulation
programs. The guidance is broad and does not provide specific advice
for implementation by individual companies or organizations.
The brief but thoughtful forward by Matthew Arnold of the
World Resources Institute sets the tone for the text.3 Mr. Arnold
effectively invites readers, even those skeptical about self-regulation,

to consider what Dr. lannuzzi presents with an open mind.'
I

ALPHONSE IANNUZZI, JR., INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (2001).

Senior Attorney, New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation. This review expresses the author's opinions. Nothing stated herein
is endorsed by the New York State of Department of Environmental Conservation.
2
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at back cover.
3
4

supranote 1, at foreword.
IANNUZZI, JR., supranote 1, at foreword.
IANNUZZI, JR.,
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The author's preface continues the in the same tenor as the
foreword. Dr. lannuzzi provides a brief auto-biographical sketch in
which he describes his experiences working as an inspector for the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Quality.5 Mistrust or
cynicism might impede consideration of proposals for industry selfregulation. By offering his credentials and openly acknowledging that
public mistrust of industry exists, Dr. Iannuzzi eases the way for
thoughtful consideration of his ideas.
The body of the book begins with a broad overview of the
current regulatory model.6 Scant attention is given to the history of
how existing regulatory programs have evolved. Instead, the text
leaps quickly to a brief review of flaws of the current regulatory
system.1 This portion of the book relies heavily on references to
others who have found fault with the existing system.' A weakness is
that the indictments are so broad. Specific problems and alternatives
are not addressed. Environmental regulations are criticized as
unwieldy complex and inflexible.'
Identical criticisms can be made regarding virtually every
regulatory system in our country. Who hasn't heard complaints that
the Internal Revenue Code is too complex, that applying for a
subdivision approval is onerous, or that the Department of Motor
Vehicles is utterly rigid? These criticisms have the virtue of being
unassailably true on the surface. But, general complaints provide little
guidance about how to correct problems other than elimination of the
program at issue.
The author also criticizes the Environmental Protection
Agency [hereinafter EPA] and other agencies for relying on enforcement statistics rather than compliance information to measure the
success of their programs."0 This type of complaint can sometimes
5

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at

preface.

6

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note

7

IANNUZZI, JR.,

8
9

See e.g. IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 8.
See e.g. IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 2-4.
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 3-7.
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be rhetorical cover for less stringent application of environmental
laws, and some readers may become wary.
The author implies that regulatory agencies have historically
focused on enforcement statistics as their only measure of success and
that they only recently began to look at other indicators of
compliance." The discussion does not provide an explanation of the
historic use of compliance information other than enforcement
statistics. We are left to assume that enforcement statistics were the
only metrics tracked regarding compliance rates.
The book hits its stride with the four case studies dealing with
self-regulation and flexible regulatory programs.' 2 The first case
study deals with the chemical industry's Responsible Care program. 3
Responsible Care began with the Canadian Chemical Producers
Association as an attempt to revive their public image following a
cyanide release in Bhopal, India which killed two thousand people.' 4
The program is now international.
The case study provides a brief overview of the elements of
the program, an analysis of the benefits of the program, a section
regarding criticism of the program and a synopsis that recapitulates
the main points of the preceding sections followed by the author's
conclusions. All of the case studies follow the format used in the
Responsible Care case study. Following this format carries the reader
toward to the conclusions reached at the end of each chapter.
The discussion of the program provides a broad overview of
its elements. The reported benefits of the program are presented in
plausible detail, but specific information about implementation of the
program by industry is not provided. Generally, the program is
credited with increased safety in the manufacture, transportation and
disposal of chemicals. 5

11

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note
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IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 35-110.
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IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at
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1, at 6.

35-52.

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 35.
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 50.
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The synopsis draws from the criticisms of the program to
conclude that improvements in the program could be made,
particularly if the program is to gain credibility with the public. Dr.
lannuzzi identifies the key weaknesses as lack of transparency to the
public, lack of clear objectives and uniform measurements that
demonstrate compliance, and an lack of participation by smaller
firms. 6 These weaknesses form a thread running through the other
case studies and eventually become part of Dr. lannuzzi's guidelines
for forming a successful program for self-regulation. But, he seems
to view the Responsible Care program as a base upon which
improvements should be made.
The second case study reviews the Environmental Protection
Agency's Project XL.I7 Project XL was a pilot program initiated by
EPA in May 1995 to encourage innovative approaches to achieving
environmental compliance. 18 The goal was to develop innovative
alternatives to the current regulatory system. 9 In exchange for
regulatory flexibility, each project sponsor was to achieve better
environmental results than would have been attained through
compliance with existing regulatory programs.2 °
The project allowed regulated entities to develop their own
approaches to achieving compliance. The proposals were implemented through site specific agreements for the participating

facilities."' Reported benefits of the program include pollution reduction, increased public participation, and improved relationships
between industry and government. 22
The terms of several projects are discussed. Among the more

interesting was a Lucent Technology project to study its ISO 14001

supra note 1,at 50-51.
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IANNUZZI, JR.,
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IANNUZZi, JR., supranote
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1,at 53-66.
60 Fed. Reg. 27282 (May 23, 1995).
Id. at 27283.
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Id. at 27282.
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environmental management system [hereinafter EMS].23 Lucent's
objective is to determine "what the advantages are to having an EMS24
and if incentives should be given to those that employ them.
Unfortunately, the text does not provide any answer to those
tantalizing questions.
The criticisms of the project cited by Dr. lannuzzi reveal
potentially serious flaws that would have to be addressed for the
program to expand and endure. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the
program is the uncertain legality of the site specific agreements. Dr.
lannuzzi cites two legal scholars who conclude that the site specific
rule-making exceeded the EPA's authority and leaves the program's
participants vulnerable to citizen's suits.25 The lack of any analysis
of, or even citation to, the relevant laws weakens the book.
Additional criticisms of Project XL included lack of clarity in
the criteria for participation, a difficult application process, and a
continued emphasis on potential enforcement by EPA.26 Again, the
process favored those who had significant resources, limiting its
appeal to smaller entities.
The third case study examines the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration's Voluntary Protection Program [hereinafter
VPP].2 7 The VPP is a regulatory program for facilities with excellent
safety records based on stringent internal standards. By participating
in the program, regulated entities earn recognition and a high level of
independence regarding health and safety.28
Dr. lannuzzi examines the VPP program as an example of a
well developed government voluntary compliance program. He
offers the VPP as a source of information and a model from which
environmental regulators and managers might learn. As he explains
it: "... an evaluation of the effectiveness of this voluntary program,
23
24
25
26
27

28

IANNUZZI,
IANNUZZI,
IANNUZZI,
IANNUZZi,

JR., supranote I, at 57.
JR., supra note I, at 57.
JR., supra note 1, at 62.
JR., supra note 1, at 64-65.

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 67-85.
IANNUZZI, JR., supranote I, at 68.
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with its significant history in an area related to environmental
protection, should result in relevant information about the potential
29
of industry self-regulation."
OSHA launched the VPP in 1982 to allow selected facilities
with exemplary safety programs to achieve working protection
beyond OSHA standards because it concluded " . . . enforcement
alone can never fully achieve the objectives of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act."3
This quote mirrors the author's contention that self-regulation
for environmental compliance is necessary because the country has
too many facilities and too few inspectors. In this regard, he seems to
discount the ability of inspectors to set priorities and focus on bad
actors without the creation of a self-regulation program.
The fourth case study reviews the StarTrack program.3
StarTrack was a program implemented by EPA Region I (New
England) in which regulated entities would self-certify environmental
compliance through third party audits.32 The author draws a
comparison to the securities industry and its reliance on third party
auditors.33 This book was written before the recent scandal involving
the collapse of the Enron Corporation and revelations about the
dubious reliability of audits. However, those scandals highlight the
dangers of reliance on third party audits. The author's faith in the
auditing systems described seems misplaced in light of Enron's
collapse.
After the larger case studies, several internal initiatives by
specific companies such as Ford Motor Company, IBM, Johnson &
Johnson and others are examined.34 These involve corporations that
have incorporated so called 'green' initiatives in their marketing
program. The thrust of the chapter is that exceeding environmental
29
30

31
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supra note 1,at 68.

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 68.
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 87-109.

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 87.
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1,at 87-88.
IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 111-43.
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standards set by the government can provide competitive advantages.
In the final chapter, the author uses the criticisms of the
programs in each case study to form guidelines for development of
new programs. If the book had not presented criticisms of the
program, it would have come across as unrealistic propaganda.
Instead, consideration of the program's criticisms make it easier to
give serious consideration to the possible benefits of developing selfregulation programs using Dr. Ianuzzi's principles.
Both within the case studies, and within the final chapter, the
recapitulation of previously stated matters were distracting. At these
points, readers will be tempted to skim or even skip segments of the
text. Despite the reiteration, the book is a slim one hundred seventy
four pages, including bibliographies at the end of each chapter.
The perspective of the book is that of a business manager.
Facts and figures regarding business abound. Details about policy
implementation and specific legal requirements are not presented.
Therefore, businessmen may find the book more suited to their
interests than will lawyers.
The text includes abbreviated citations rather than footnotes
or endnotes. Readers interested in finding specific citations will have
to cross- reference the bibliography at the end of the particular
chapter with the notes in the text. Some of the references in the text
are too vague to allow direct correlation to a specific reference in the
bibliography. For example, the StarTrack case study includes a
citation to "(EPA 1998)." 3 The bibliography at the end of the chapter
includes four documents that fit that description.36
The reliance on secondary sources at points is also a
weakness. In one instance, lack of citation to a primary source may
have led to an error. The author comments that current regulations
require "best available control technology without considering cost
... "' He offers no citation for this assertion.
, at 88.

35

IANNUZZI, JR., supra note
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IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1, at 109.
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IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 1,at 2.
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Best Available Control Technology is a term of art, with at
least one specific meaning:
an emissions limitation... based on the maximum degree of

reduction for each pollutant subject to regulation under the
[Clean Air] Act which would be emitted from any proposed

major stationary source or major modification which the
administrator, on a case by case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental and economic impacts and other costs,
determines to be achievable for such source or modification...38

That definition provides for consideration of economic
feasibility and other factors. Whatever the explanation for the
disparity between this definition and the author's assertion, inclusion
of a citation would have eliminated any real or perceived inaccuracy.
Overall, this is an interesting book, even if it is not as
compelling as it could have been. This is not a broadside against the
existing system, but a thoughtful examination of approaches to
programs that could enhance environmental protection. For those
interested in the potential of self-regulation, the case studies will be
interesting. The dialectic format pulls the reader along an easily
followed path to the conclusions offered. The information and
analysis would be valuable for anyone working within or attempting
to develop a self-regulation or voluntary compliance program.
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Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 40 C.F.R. §52.21(b)(12)(2001).

